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FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH  
TO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7244  
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEAHLA/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0190  
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHRMAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY  
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/HQ USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY  
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RUCPDOG/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 RIYADH 002486

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR DAS GGRAY  
DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KKOLEVAR, A/S KHARBERT, AND  
MWILLIAMSON  
S/CT FOR GFEIERSTEIN AND BAVERILL  
DS/ATA FOR KMALLOY  
TREASURY PASS TO A/S CLOWERY  
DHS PASS TO TWARRICK AND DGRANT  
CIA PASS TO TCOYNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017  
TAGS: [KCIP](#) [EPET](#) [ENERG](#) [PTER](#) [SA](#)  
SUBJECT: FOLLOW ON MEETING TO INTERAGENCY VISIT

REF: A. RIYADH 2475  
[1](#)B. RIYADH 2474  
[1](#)C. RIYADH 1974

Classified By: DCM Michael Gfoeller for reasons  
1.4 (b) (c) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs  
two and three.

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Summary  
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[1](#)2. (S) Embassy Riyadh notes the impending January POTUS  
visit provides a unique opportunity to help us move approval  
for a high-priority Ministry of Interior(MOI)-inter-agency  
cooperation agreement through an often sclerotic Saudi  
bureaucracy at an accelerated pace. In a December 11 meeting  
with the Saudi Minister of Interior, MOI officials provided  
additional information and clarification regarding their  
request to deepen cooperation with several agencies  
represented during a December 3-5 visit to Riyadh (reftels A  
and B). MOI officials also provided preliminary answers to a  
list of questions submitted by the visiting delegation.

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Action Requests  
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[1](#)3. (S) Action Request: Embassy Riyadh requests NEA  
coordinate with the interagency group to provide a draft text  
of an inter-agency-MOI agreement to Embassy Riyadh for  
submission to the MOI by December 31. Submission of a draft  
document would allow us to include this inter-agency  
agreement as an agenda item for POTUS in discussions with  
King Abdullah or relevant ministers. While we recognize this

document is unlikely to be ready for final signature by the mid-January POTUS visit, we could significantly accelerate approval of the agreement if we had a draft under consideration during this historic visit. Embassy Riyadh trusts the additional details below from the MOI should prove useful in guiding the inter-agency discussion and drafting of an initial text.

¶4. (SBU) Action Request: Embassy Riyadh requests the Department of the Treasury urgently provide a copy of the original financial documentation for the 1970s U.S.-Saudi Joint Economic Commission (JECOR). This organization is currently being studied as a possible model for a new inter-agency technical assistance group. Additional details and documentation, particularly regarding the project's financial structure, would be most appreciated. Information may be sent to Economic Counselor Robert Murphy at [murphyrb2@state.gov](mailto:murphyrb2@state.gov) or Energy Attache Shannon Ross at [rosssm2@state.gov](mailto:rosssm2@state.gov).

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Keen Interest in JECOR Model  
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¶5. (S) On December 11, Pol Counselor Rundell and Energy Attache Ross met with MOI officials Dr. Saud al Semari, Director of Modernization and Joint Working Group Co-Chair; Dr. Kahlid Al-Ageel, Manager, High Commission on Industrial Security; Abdullah Al-Hammad, Budget Director; and Captain Bandar Al-Subaie, Assistant to Major General Dr. Saad Al-Jabri, Senior Security Advisor to the Assistant Minister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayif. MG Dr. Al-Jabri also

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later joined the meeting. The MOI remains eager to move the inter-agency cooperation project forward quickly.

¶6. (C) The MOI is clearly eager to learn more about the 1970s to 1990s era JECOR project, and our interlocutors have expressed a strong desire to meet with both former U.S. officials and Saudi officials who worked on JECOR projects to better understand how they functioned. End of year holiday and Hajj travel have complicated scheduling this meeting, but we anticipate holding a meeting for our MOI counterparts to meet former U.S. officials by early January. The MOI also requested we ask our former officials to write a short account of how JECOR functioned during their time there; we have agreed to relay this request.

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Tightening the Focus of Assistance to CIP  
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¶7. (S) Dr. Al-Semari stated the primary focus of the MOI's request for assistance concerned critical infrastructure protection (CIP), which involved the work of many of the MOI's directorates. He emphasized the request goes beyond the Facilities Security Force (FSF), the entity which the SAG is in the process of creating to protect critical infrastructure facilities.

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Questionnaire Feedback  
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¶8. (S) While waiting for the MOI to complete a white paper in response to our questions presented by the interagency group during the December 5 meeting (reftel B), they provided some initial feedback to most of the questions as follows:

¶A. Program Organization

--Does the MOI prefer the single point of contact (aka JECOR) model for interfacing with various agencies of the USG, or would the MOI prefer to negotiate separate agreements with each USG agency? Does the MOI prefer to work with a unified

funding mechanism for administering all programs?

Answer: Yes, the MOI prefers a single point of contact. However, our interlocutors seemed less certain regarding their preferred funding model. Dr. Al-Semari asked for additional details on JECOR's financial model. Pol Counselor Rundell detailed several of the mechanics of the project: funds were transferred from the SAG to the USG as a lump sum into a "trust fund" covering many projects, but each project was individually budgeted with a detailed financial plan. Dr. Al-Semari asked how this model differed from the administration model currently used by several of the SAG's European partners. The MOI appears to be in an information-gathering phase regarding their preferred financial model.

--Is it possible to obtain a copy of the Bearing Point report produced for the MOI? Has Bearing Point produced other reports for the MOI on other modernization issues of which we should be aware? When completed, could we obtain a copy of your Strategic Plan, which we understand is currently in process?

Answer: The strategic plan is still in process, but the MOI appeared amenable to sharing it once it is completed. The officials seemed unsure about precise Bearing Point report we were requesting.

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#### B. Program Mission

--Can you please provide a mission statement for the Facility Security Force? What are the other elements within the MOI that you envision the USG cooperating with as part of this cooperation program? If so, can you please describe these elements?

Answer: The MOI will provide a mission statement for the FSF. Dr. Al-Semari then provided an overview of the major MOI directorates, to include:

--Public Security - law enforcement, highway patrol, special emergency forces, special response forces;

--Border Guard - including land-based and Coast Guard components;

--Civil Defense - including fire and emergency response;

--Facilities Security Force - A recently-established 35,000 man force to protect critical infrastructure facilities;

--"Mujahaddin," or Protective Security - Provides protective security details in remote or under-populated areas. For example, the Mujahaddin escorts Saudi Aramco drilling rigs on operations in the remote Rhub-al-Kali zone, the "Empty Quarter."

--Special Security Forces - Provides protection for high-threat buildings and installations, such as government and diplomatic installations. Includes an anti-terrorist component, and special forces.

--Prisons Directorate;

--Passports and Immigration;

--Narcotics Control;

--Intelligence; and

-- Administration and Service Delivery.

Dr. Al-Ageel has indicated high priority directorates for cooperation early in the program are likely to be Public

Security, the Border Guard, Civil Defense, FSF, and the Mujahaddin. Dr. Al-Semari and Dr. Al-Ageel also highlighted the role of the MOI's High Commission on Industrial Security (HCIS), the regulator for safety and security standards for all of the KSA's major industrial sites, including critical sites such as water, power, and energy facilities. The HCIS had a role in reaction to, mitigation of, and recovery after industrial accidents, natural disasters, or terrorist attacks. (Note: The HCIS reports directly to the Assistant Minister of Interior, and is not in a directorate. End note.)

#### C. Program Orientation

##### Foreign Military Sales:

--What specific MOI units would seek to purchase defense equipment and services? Can you please describe the mission of these units? Have you identified notional equipment and training requirements? If so, can you describe these requirements?

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Answer: The MOI is likely to seek an FMS capability. The MOI will work on providing additional details on MOI units' capabilities and weapon systems the MOI may seek to purchase.

##### Maritime Issues:

--Will the existing Coast Guard handle the maritime aspects of protecting critical infrastructure, or do you plan to develop a maritime capability within the Facility Security Force?

Answer: The FSF will share responsibility for maritime facilities with the Coast Guard. The FSF is taking over gradual control for maritime control of critical facilities as it grows its capabilities.

--Do you plan to develop a capability for maritime interdiction through helicopters?

Answer: Yes.

##### Command and Control:

--We understand the MOI may have developed an integrated "command and control" center ("fusion center") where all of its various units are represented. Is it possible to see this center? Are the MODA and SANG represented in this center also? Are key basic services, such as SWC or SEC (water, power, etc.), or strategic state industries, such as Saudi Aramco or SABIC, represented at this command center?

Answer: Yes, there is an integrated command and control center within the MOI. MODA and SANG are represented. Industry does not appear to be represented in it at this time.

##### CyberSecurity:

--Would you envision this program eventually encompassing a cybersecurity component? Which elements of the MOI or other agencies would have the lead on this component? Has any work or legal infrastructure been established in this area yet for critical infrastructure protection?

Answer: There is a general law regarding cybersecurity in place in the KSA. It includes some measures relevant to industrial facilities. The law is still new, and is in the process of being implemented. The MOI plans for the FSF to eventually have some cybercrime responsibilities relevant to critical infrastructure, but for now, the focus remains on securing physical installations.

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Wrapping Up and Moving Forward  
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19. (S) As the conversation concluded, Dr. Al-Jabri noted, "The King is happy with the approach being discussed, he himself is behind the FSF. The Ministry of Finance is also happy with the approach." Dr. Al-Semari quipped, "When it comes to energy protection, everyone is supportive." In laying out the path forward, Dr. Al-Jabri explained, "It is important to know how our bureaucracy works, the MOF and MOI should write together to the Royal Court (to propose the inter-agency cooperation). We're trying to deal with this in an efficient way, with a bottom up approach." Dr. Al-Jabri then clarified that he was in favor of a separate but parallel agreement to the December 2006 MOU which established the Joint Working Group. PolCounselor Rundell wrapped up by

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stating that we should view the impending POTUS visit as an "engine to drive forward issues," noting we may be able to get things done before February which will normally be impossible.

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